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In recent years after the beginning of the transition process, firms in Central and
Eastern European countries have been trying hard to find access to international
markets and production chains. Rapidly changing institutional, technological and
demand conditions together with decades of isolation from world markets do not
let ,,stand-alone strategies" appear very successful in this context.
The paper presents networking activities as a promising alternative for Central
and Eastern European firms (CEEF) to organize international transactions. As
several theories show, network forms of organization can — by establishing an
atmosphere of trust and stability and by pooling resources and information —
make it possible for network members to realize an economic advantage over
external competitors that is higher than in markets or hierarchies. Among various
types of networking activities, it is especially long-term-orientated relations that
offer the possibility for CEEF to participate in an international exchange of cru-
cial technologies and to upgrade their position in global production chains in the
long run. (L22)I. Introduction
1
Since the beginning of the transition process in the late 1980's, companies in the
Central and Eastern European countries have to struggle for a position on inter-
national markets. They have to undergo a fundamental restructuring process in
order to become competitive in a system of market economy. The heritage from
decades of socialist planning — a distorted specialization pattern, a range of
products not designed according to consumer preferences, little incentive for in-
novation and a lack of management know-how as well as of financial resour-
ces — provides numerous obstacles here. In addition, along with western com-
panies, they have to cope with rapidly changing market conditions in a global en-
vironment, making market access even more difficult. The question of how to link
into international production chains thus becomes crucial.
This paper highlights the advantages of a network organization in a certain eco-
nomic environment as a possible way of overcoming the barriers to entry on in-
ternational markets for CEEF from a theoretical point of view. The first part of
the paper describes the actual economic environment, that is, the changing market
conditions that companies in the Central and Eastern European countries face; the
second part provides a theoretical analysis of network forms of organization, us-
ing different theoretical approaches; the third part assesses the different forms of
networking activities, and the fourth part gives a brief conclusion.
Research for this paper was undertaken with support from the European Commission's Phare ACE
Program 1997 integrating Enterprises in Central European Countries in Transition into European
Corporate Structure", project no. 96-2003-R.II. The economic environment: A survey of recent developments
As conditions on world markets are changing rapidly, CEEF, still being in the
middle of a rather painful restructuring process, cannot expect to enter a kind of
closed season in the hunt for international competitiveness. On the contrary: If
they want to survive in the medium and longer term, they have to manage the
enormous leap from being more or less protected from the world market influence
into being able to cope with the full pressure of globalization.
What does this mean in detail? Dunning (1995) defined globalization as a process
that integrates the international value added activities of firms .in such a way
that the prosperity of one firm is inextricably bound up with that of its foreign
production and marketing activities". As the world is moving from a set of inde-
pendent enterprises linked by market-trade towards an integrated system of inter-
nationally fragmented production, the degree of interdependence among eco-
nomic actors and consequently, the degree of organizational integration is neces-
sarily rising. The world is becoming a network of production, involving the dan-
ger of exclusion for those firms that do not take active steps to become a part of
it. This fundamental change in the economic environment is the outcome of sev-
eral developments that have occurred in the past two decades; they can be
roughly assigned to three categories:
• The first category represents changes on the market side, respectively de-
mand side: Since the mid-seventies, with markets of mass products becom-
ing more and more saturated and competition becoming international, con-
sumer demand has turned from quantity to quality, from mass consumption
of standardized goods to selective demand of differentiated goods. This im-
posed a considerable crisis on large, vertically integrated firms, which had
until then been very successful in price competition because they had to a3
large extent been able to make use of economies of scale. The change in the
consumer orientation, however, required flexibility instead of standardized
production methods, production in small, varying series, the emphasis of
quality instead of mere price competition and a more intensive use of out-
sourcing strategies, complex technologies and qualified staff. Some econo-
mists see in this development a new economic paradigm, which is commonly
referred to as the concept of ,,flexible specialization" (Piore and Sabel,
1984).
• The second category represents changes on the institutional side: This
mainly refers to the rapid economic integration which took place in the past
decades. Obviously, firms are driven more and more towards a strategy of
optimizing their value chains globally by the rise of trade blocks, implying a
reduction of trade barriers inside the block, but often an increase of trade
barriers to the outside. Thus, access to markets inside these trade blocks
(e.g. the EU) is made more difficult for non-member countries, leading to in-
creasing cross-border flows of capital and technology and to the rise of in-
ternational production strategies: Whereas in earlier times, international in-
tegration was dominated by trade relations, this changed recently in favour
of foreign investment and other forms of foreign involvements (Table 1).
Table 1 - Average yearly growth rates of world exports of goods and services
and world foreign direct investment (in percent)
world exports of goods











Source: BeyfuB (1996).• The third category represents changes on the technological side: Over recent
years, technological development has accelerated considerably. New tech-
nologies allow higher flexibility of production and communication and offer
the possibility for firms to buy, produce and sell in any part of the world.
Apart from that, life cycles of products have become shorter, which requires
more rapid innovation and product development. As a consequence, intan-
gible and immaterial assets such as information and know-how have become
a resource of major importance along the global value chains.
All these aspects being essential for the process of globalization cannot be con-
sidered separately. They are both cause and consequence of each other, in the
sense that e.g. flexible production meeting the differentiated consumer demands
would not have been possible without employing new production technologies;
but these new technologies might not have been developed if consumer demands
had not changed significantly.
As global production networks are expanding and non-territorially-specific re-
sources such as information and technology become more and more important in
the production process, firms become less and less dependent on locations, but
more and more dependent on other firms in several locations.
2 Thus, globalization
and so-called deep integration, i.e. integration via international production rather
than via arm's-length trade (shallow integration), go hand in hand in order to
somehow integrate mutual dependencies. For it is precisely these dependencies of
firms trying to survive in a globally competitive environment that raise the ques-
tion of finding an organizational form which allows them to get access to re-
sources, know-how and technologies, to specialized suppliers and to production
Storper (1995) mentions in this context the replacement of locational factors of production, which a
single firm in a certain location controls, by a large number of locations, which are integrated in a
production network.and distribution possibilities abroad. For CEEF facing heavy shortcomings con-
cerning crucial resources and access to international markets, this question is es-
sential.
Keeping this in mind, it is now to be asked which kind of organizational strategy
between eastern and western firms might prove to be most efficient in organizing
international production transactions. The following section intends to examine
from a theoretical point of view whether cross-border networks of firms can be
regarded as a suitable form of organization for CEEF seeking access to interna-
tional markets and resources in a volatile economic environment.
HI. Network forms of organization: A theoretical approach
Production by means of labour division can be considered as a value chain
3,
which links firms on different stages of the production process and often in differ-
ent locations together. In principle, firms have three choices to organize their
transactions along the value chain: make, cooperate or buy. ,,Buy" represents the
classical market organization (,,arm's-length transactions"), where atomized ac-
tors meet on an extremely short-term basis to perform their transaction which is
coordinated by the price mechanism. ,,Make" represents the (vertical or horizon-
tal) integration of transactions into the firm itself where they are coordinated by
internal hierarchical regulations. For a while, these two options were seen as the
dominant organizational alternatives, leaving the whole range of network activi-
ties in-between the two ends on the organizational scale" out of consideration.
Only little by little, economic theory acknowledged the fact that economic actors
Value chain is not meant to express a contrast as to the term ,,network". It does not represent a
strictly vertical process here, but — as nations as well as firms get more and more integrated in the
context of the production process — rather a concept of an all-embracing global network of
production with vertical, horizontal and diagonal links between the actors along the stages of
production.are not acting in an isolated way but that they are embedded in an extensive envi-
ronment of social relations of various kinds; thus, network activities, which are
based on social interacting, were integrated as so-called ,,hybrid organizations"
(Williamson, 1985) into the analysis of economic organizations.
The concept of a network is determined by the relations among its actors. Since
markets as well as hierarchies also.consist of relations among economic actors,
they can likewise be understood as networks in a broader sense. What is different
between the three organizational alternatives is the mechanism by which the rela-
tions are coordinated: In the market the coordination is effected by prices, in a hi-
erarchy by rules and regulations and in a network by cooperation.
A network of firms is commonly defined as a set of cooperative relations among
legally independent but economically dependent firms, which aim at coordinating
parts of their economic activities in order to gain an advantage over their competi-
tors (Sydow, 1992a). Networking comprises a wide range of cooperative activi-
ties between markets and hierarchies. These include activities with little commit-
ment among firms, such as simple subcontracting or outward processing, as well
as activities that imply equity involvement, like e.g. joint ventures (Figure 1).
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The aim of the theoretical overview now is to find out which organizational form
is optimal for which type of transactions in a certain economic environment and
to give a hint why networking activities can prove particularly advantageous for
CEEF on their way from transition towards globalization. In the field of business
organization, there is a vast literature on the characteristics and advantages of dif-
ferent alternatives to organize a firm's transactions, (e.g. Blaine, 1994; Sydow,
1992a) Since it is impossible to refer to all of these different approaches, three
important views have been selected, which focus each on different aspects of or-
ganizational forms: first, the view of the transaction cost theory, focusing on cost
aspects of organization; second, the view of interorganizational theories, focusing
on aspects of dependence and interdependence among economic actors; and fi-
nally, the view of the strategic management approach, focusing on strategies of
firms to gain an innovation advantage over their competitors.
Transaction cost theory
The transaction cost approach aims at clarifying the cost efficiency of alternative
organizational forms to coordinate economic transactions
4 in a given economic
environment. In principle, it is based on ideas by Ronald H. Coase (1937), who
was the first to present the firm as an institutional alternative to the market. He
explains the organization of certain transactions inside a firm (or hierarchy) with
the existence of costs of organizing them via the market mechanism. After being
almost forgotten for a long time, the theory was developed further in the 1970s
and 1980s, mainly by O. E. Williamson, who sees economic organization of
transactions as a contracting problem: Since it is
 ;— under the assumptions of
According to Williamson, a transaction is assumed when a good or a service crosses a technically
separable boundary.8
bounded rationality and opportunism
5 among economic actors — virtually im-
possible to design a perfect contract for transactions in a volatile economic envi-
ronment, contracting becomes very costly, implying for instance costs of search-
ing for an adequate contracting partner, costs of bargaining, costs of control and
costs of adjusting the contract to changes in the original conditions. These costs
are generally referred to as transaction costs.
If transaction costs reach a certain level, it makes sense to ,,take the transaction
from the market" and to integrate it into the ,,firm" as a hierarchical system, that
is, to choose the ,,make" instead of the ,,buy" alternative. Inside a firm, transac-
tion costs can be substantially lowered because uncertainty is replaced by a co-
ordination by hierarchical instructions which make the transaction cost-intensive
contracting process in the market obsolete. Besides, the possibility of opportunis-
tic behaviour is not given to the same extent if a transaction happens inside a
firm.
The level of transaction costs is influenced by several characteristics of the trans-
action resulting from the economic environment. The literature (e.g. Picot, 1982;
Bonus, 1986; Picot/Dietl, 1990) mentions six essential characteristics in this
context:
• uncertainty: A transaction can involve uncertainty in a double sense. First,
an economic actor is confronted with uncertainty about the behaviour of his
transaction partners. Considering the assumption of opportunism, this im-
poses high costs of safeguarding the transaction in the market. This is espe-
cially relevant for transactions involving R&D and flows of information and
Opportunism is a concept which goes a step further than the neo-classical assumption of self-interest
among market actors. It is defined as pursuing self-interest, even using guile and deceit, which render
the behaviour of market actors extremely unpredictable.know-how among the actors. A way of protecting such information from
abuse is the integration of transactions of this kind into the firm and thus in-
ternalizing the information flow. Second, an economic actor is confronted
with uncertainty about changes in the economic environment. In a world of
rapid technological change and volatile consumer preferences, contracting in
unstable markets involves high transaction costs, in particular concerning the
adjustment of contracts. These can be avoided by internalizing transactions.
6
specific investment: Sourcing strategies and an increasing specialization
along the production chain often require investment of buyers, respectively
suppliers, e.g. in certain technologies, equipment or human capital, which is
transaction-specific and cannot be used profitably in other transactions. This
creates a strong dependence of the investor on his transaction partner, high
transaction costs of safeguarding the transaction and thus a reason to inter-
nalize it.
frequency: The more frequently transaction partners interact, the more their
dependence will increase and the stronger the inclination for internalization
will be. The influence of the frequency of transaction on dependence, how-
ever, is limited; thus, it plays only a minor role in the organizational deci-
sion-making of firms.
complexity: A transaction is complex if it implies difficulties in its evalua-
tion. This is not the case with simple, standardized steps of production as
they mostly occur in labour-intensive industries. However, it is the case for
many transactions involving R&D and information flows, whose quantitative
A disadvantage of internalizing transactions in this context is, however, that there is no easy way out
of this decision if it does not prove to be the most efficient strategy after economic conditions have
changed. Thus, it involves considerable inflexibility for economic actors.10
evaluation and exact assignment to each transaction partner is often impos-
sible so that they cannot be easily organized in the market. Since technologi-
cal development has accelerated and since information has become a re-
source of major importance in a world of rapid technological change and in-
novation, the complexity of transactions has become extremely relevant for
firms.
• centrality: It does not make much sense to internalize a step of production
which is not of strategic importance (,,central") for the quality of the final
product because it can be bought on the market without excessive transac-
: tion costs. This is not true though for inputs which are essential and non-
separable as to the quality of the final product and might endanger its repu-
tation if they are not delivered in a proper state and time. These involve a
strong dependence of the buyer on the supplier — especially if the transac-
tion is not only characterized by centrality, but also by complexity and spe-
cific investment —, raising transaction costs to a considerable level.
• transaction atmosphere: The transaction atmosphere describes all cultural,
legal and technological conditions which are likely to influence transaction
; costs. This includes for instance a highly efficient information and communi-
cation technology and a stable legal framework which decreases transaction
costs by lowering uncertainty in the economic environment. Such a frame-
work is still underdeveloped in Central and Eastern Europe.
When considering the most efficient organizational form, transaction costs are
only one half of the story. The other half that has to be taken into account are
production costs, which are influenced by the choice of organization mainly
through the opportunities of realizing economies of scale and scope. In a world of
labour division, non-hierarchical organizations, including networks, prove to be11
more efficient than hierarchies in this context because they are to a larger extent
able to realize advantages of specialization and as a consequence, external
economies of scale and scope than vertically integrated firms, which have inter-
nalized all steps of production — even those in which they are not particularly
competitive. Thus, it only makes sense to organize a transaction hierarchically if
the relative advantage concerning transaction costs overcompensates the relative
disadvantage concerning production costs.
Figure 2 - Comparison of transaction costs and production costs in market and
hierarchy
Source: Williamson (1985).
Figure 2 illustrates these reflections: In the diagram, k represents the specific in-
vestment as a representative of all transaction characteristics and K as the de-
pendent variable represents the total costs (production and transaction costs). The
AG-curve is the transaction cost advantage of market organizations, which is high
when specific investment (k) among economic actors is low so that their transac-
tion does not require a cost-intensive contracting process. With rising k, however,
it falls sharply. The production cost advantage of markets, AC, exceeds the trans-
action cost advantage, but also falls with rising k. This can be explained by the12
fact that the more transaction-specific the equipment of a firm becomes, the less it
can;take advantage of economies of scale. Aggregating the cost advantages, it be-
comes evident that from a certain level of investment specificity, kh onwards it is
more efficient to internalize transactions into a hierarchical organization because
the aggregated cost advantage of market organization becomes zero. Below this
level* however, it is cheaper to organize transactions in the market.
So far, the analysis was mainly focused on the two extremes on the organizational
scale — on markets and hierarchies. The most important part of transaction cost
theory tries to face this shortcoming by placing all types of hybrid or network or-
ganizational forms simply in-between market and hierarchy. This seems to be
plausible because as a hybrid organizational form, a network comprises elements
of markets as well as of hierarchies (Table 2).
Table 2 - Characteristic elements of markets and hierarchies
Market
functional specialization












Source: Siebert (1991).CJGS fnstituts fur
Like in a market organization, we can find a division of labour (functional spe-
cialization) among the members of a network — in contrast to the integration of
functions into a single firm as it is typical of a hierarchical organization. Thus,
network firms can take advantage of market aggregation economies, which result
from a cost degression due to specialization and learning curve effects. Addi-
tionally, they can benefit from economies of scope and synergy effects', which,
however, do not occur in market organizations. Another element that networks
share with market organizations is the pressure to work efficiently. This pressure
results from a certain competition among the firms in the network, which is
stronger than in a hierarchical, but less strong than in a market organization.
Instead of opportunism dominating market transactions, the relations among firms
in a network are — like in a hierarchical organization — ideally characterized by
trust. Trust and a cooperative behaviour lower transactions costs and facilitate
free flows of information. Due to this relatively free flow of information in a net-
work and due to the fact that network firms are often linked by highly efficient in-
formation and communication systems, they cannot be seen as information is-
lands" like the actors in a market organization.
It is obvious from its characteristics that a network organization of firms can
— under certain circumstances — offer advantages compared to markets as well
as to hierarchies:
In Figure 3, k represents again the level of investment specificity, G represents
general transaction costs and M(k), X(k) and H(k) represent the specific transac-
tion costs of markets, networks and hierarchies, each depending on the level of
The phenomenon of synergy is defined as ,,the sum is larger than its parts", which — in the context
of cooperative networks — means that firms, by combining their potential, in a cooperative way, can
realize an additional advantage which exceeds their potential.14
investment specificity. Networks show the lowest level, of. transaction costs be-
tween ko and ki; consequently, they are the optimal form, of organization for me-
dium levels of investment specificity.
Figure 3 - Transaction costs in markets, networks and hierarchies
M(k) X(k)
Source: Williamson (1991).
However/ this illustration does not consider two important aspects: First, the fact
that hierarchical organizations imply additional, so-called internal transaction
costs, which are the result of diminishing returns to management (Coase, 1937).
Among these are costs of organizational adjustment due to rigid bureaucratic
structures, costs of internal conflicts and coordination in very large hierarchical
organizations, costs of acquiring information from outside and of passing on the
information through all levels of the hierarchy and costs of limiting opportunistic
behaviour of employees, which can occur despite of hierarchies, especially in
large organizations being difficult to control. Second, the possibility that transac-
tion costs in a network can be reduced in the long run. Williamson's approach is
static; a dynamic approach, however, has to consider the development of interac-
tions in a network over time. Long-term interactions might intensify the relations
among the network members, and establish an atmosphere of trust so that uncer-15
taintyand the danger of opportunism are reduced. This creates incentives for
mutual specific investment and reinforces interdependencies. Thus, network
forms of organization can in the long run develop additional transaction cost ad-
vantages. In Figure 4, this is illustrated by a shift from the short-run transaction
costs in a network, X(k)s, to the long-run transaction costs, X(k),. The range of
investment specificity in which networks are the optimal form of organization is
extended to ko'ki:'.
Figure 4 - Short- and long-run transaction costs in networks
G
If we also consider the production cost advantages of networks compared to hier-
archies, which result from functional specialization and stronger market incen-
tives, it is evident that ,,cooperate" might prove to be a more efficient organiza-
tional alternative than rtmake", even in a very volatile and uncertain economic
environment such as economies in transition. '
Interorganizational theories
Interorganizational theories trace the development of networking activities back
to the intention of firms to integrate external dependencies on resources into one
organization and to reduce the uncertainty of the economic environment. Exam-16
pies are the resourcedependence approach (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer
1987) and the network approach (e.g. Hakansson 1987; Hakarisson 1989).
The crucial aspect of the resource dependence approach are resources which are
essential for a firm's survival. Resources include natural, technological, human,
financial and informational resources and can have a substitutional or a comple-
mentary function. In order to get access to external resources on which they are
dependent*, firms engage in relations with other firms; the resources that are at a
firm's disposal determine its position of power in these relations.
For CEEF which mostly have access to relatively cheap, skilled human resources
and knowledge of Eastern European markets, network activities with western
firms and their resources such as technology, management know-how, reputation,
distribution channels and financial means might sometimes be the only opportu-
nity to extend their market potential and enter into global production and distri-
bution chains. Although their position in the network will presumably not be a
dominant one to start from (Figure 5), it might improve with the development of
the network relations over time, which allows for the creation of and access to
new resources and thus, for a re-allocation of power.
The network approach, which was mainly developed by Scandinavian theorists
(e.g. Hakansson 1987, Hakansson 1989; Axelsson 1990; Johanson and Mattson
1991), extends the ideas of the resource dependence approach. A network is seen
as a combination of its three integral parts: resources, actors and activities.
Pfeffer (1987) distinguishes in this context between symbiotic dependence, which occurs on a
vertical level in buyer-supplier relations, and commensalistic dependence, which occurs on a
horizontal level among firms competing in the same niche.17
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Similar to the resource dependence approach, resources — or more precisely, the
lack thereof — are the main motivation for economic actors to engage in network
relations. The resources which the network actors integrate into the network are
linked by the activities that the actors perform and through which they pool these
resources. By coordinating their resources and activities, the actors in a network,
mostly firms, intend to realize an economic advantage over their external com-
petitors, which exceeds their costs of joining the network and which is higher
than in markets and hierarchies.
The network firms or actors have access to certain resources, which determine
the position of power they hold relative to their partners. The structure of these
positions of power together with the coordination of the common and the diver-
gent intentions of the actors strongly influence the development of the network18
relations. Due to interactive learning processes and arising opportunities to use
the resource pool in the network in an innovative way, the presumably subordi-
nate position of CEEF concerning access to resources will thus most certainly
improve over time. However, it is not important whether the positions of power
are balanced in the long run as long as the network members can gain an eco-
nomic advantage out of their cooperation.
The activities performed by the actors are connected via so-called ,,activity
chains". This means that an activity of a network actor, e.g. a product innovation,
does not happen in an isolated way, but also affects other network firms. In order
to coordinate these activity chains and to make sure that all network actors can
realize an advantage out of their coordinated activities that is higher than in mar-
kets and hierarchies, extensive coordination mechanisms are needed. If e.g. a
product innovation happens in a supplier-firm, the information about this has to
reach the buyer-firm in time so that it can adapt its production process. The out-
come might be a final product of better quality and better chances on the market.
Such perfect information flows can only be established in an atmosphere of trust,
requiring stable, interdependent network relations.
The establishment of a complex network of interdependent relations out of simple
transactions requires specific investment of all members, thus increasing the mu-
tual dependence and the stability of the relations, which themselves become the
most important asset of each network member. Breaking the network becomes
extremely costly for its members because their specific investments would be
lost. Consequently, establishing network relations represents a limitation of a
firm's autonomy. Only if this limitation is overcompensated by the expected op-
portunities offered by the network — e.g. reduction of transaction costs, ex-
change of know-how and information, access to markets and resources — firms
will decide to join a network organization.19
It is obvious that the network approach describes the network of firms as an or-
ganizational form which cannot simply be placed in-between markets and hierar-
chies. It focuses on the interaction of the network members in the form of ex-
change relations which coordinate the resource and information pool among the
actors. In this way, synergies are created. These promote the process of realizing
an economic advantage over external competitors in terms of costs, quality and/or
innovation that is higher than in markets and hierarchies, where the creation of
synergies is hindered by the lack of the necessary atmosphere of trust and stabil-
ity in the arm's-length transactions of the market, respectively by the sluggish
flow of information and resources through the different levels of the hierarchy
(Figure 6).




As a consequence, the network approach —by taking into consideration the de-
velopment of the relations over time and the network-specific advantages arising
from it — takes a more dynamic view than the transaction cost approach. In an
extremely uncertain economic environment which transition economies face in the
era of globalization, firms in a network are able to adapt their interaction and to20
continuously optimize and stabilize the network relations. In the end, a single firm
cannot be seen in isolation of its network partners anymore.
Strategic management
The strategic management approach tries to shed some light on the search for a
firm's optimal strategy in a given economic setting in order to gain a comparative
advantage over its competitors. In a world of 'flexible specialization' and rapid
technological development, the key factor of a firm's competitiveness is innova-
tion. The increasing importance of cooperative strategies in international produc-
tion seems to support the hypothesis that cooperation might enhance innovation
more successfully than competition does, which contradicts the well-known
Schumpeterian view that innovation is the outcome of incentives derived from
competition alone. The argument is that if firms pursue competition instead of co-
operation strategies in the innovation process, certain risks are involved concern-
ing innovation. One risk is the possibility of competition causing a duplication of
research efforts, which could be avoided if the research activities were coordi-
nated by cooperative relations in a network. Another risk is the possibility of too
little innovation taking place. It can be argued in this context — like it is often
done by supporters of industrial policy — that the price mechanism coordinating
arm's-length transactions is not an optimal coordination mechanism for innova-
tive transactions because, e.g., it is not able to include all external effects caused
by the innovative activities of a firm. Thus, the potential for internalizing returns
on innovation will be small and might not compensate the costs and risks in-
volved. Moreover, incentives to invest in specific technologies are lowered if in-
novative transactions are organized as arm's-length transactions. The potential
investor might lose his ,,quasi-rent", which is the rent he expects from the specific
investment, but which is lost once the transaction is ended. This is another factor
that reduces innovative activities.21
Cooperative relations in a network of firms, however, foster the innovation proc-
ess by allowing firms to pool their resources and risks, by internalizing external
effects into the network organization and by enhancing a flow of information
which often cannot be obtained either in the market because of the danger of op-
portunism or in a hierarchical organization because of bureaucratic obstacles. As
such, Powell (1991) describes the information transferred in networks as
„ 'thicker' than information obtained in the market and 'freer' than that communi-
cated in a hierarchy". Thus, firms in a network organization can gain a compara-
tive advantage over their external competitors by reducing the time and increasing
the quality of the innovation process.
IV. Types of network activities: A critical categorization
In a world of rapidly changing economic conditions, globalizing markets, growing
importance of international flows of information, technology and innovation and
the formation of trade blocks, the strategy of international production in the form
of cross-border networking has been shown to offer the possibility for firms to
participate in global value-adding chains, to find access, to markets and resources
and to reduce uncertainty and one-sided dependencies by internalizing transact
tions into a set of stable relations. There is a wide range of strategic options be-
tween the two extremes on the organizational scale, markets and hierarchies,
which can be ranged according to the stability of the relations and investment in-
volvement" and according to the level of cooperation. In this context, three levels
can be distinguished: cooperation on a horizontal level, that is among firms com-
peting on the same markets, cooperation on a vertical level, that is buyer-supplier
The more firms invest into network relations, e.g. by equity involvement, the more stable the
relations become and the more uncertainty is reduced — up to the extreme of" an acquisition of other
firms. This has to be bought, however, by higher expenses concerning the establislimem of the
relations, a loss of flexibility and a higher risk of losing large investments if the relations fail.22
relations, and cooperation on a conglomerate level, that is among firms belonging
to different industries.
The evaluation of different options of networking activities from the perspective
of CEEF has to focus on the aims that these companies pursue. Although the aims
of CEEF cannot be generalized over all firms, it is possible to define four main
categories: access to crucial resources and technologies; (indirect) access to in-
ternational markets; keeping up a certain autonomy and position of influence on
decisions in the network; limiting the financial and other resources which are
needed to build up and to coordinate the network relations.
The following section is supposed to give an overview over the most important
forms of network organization, ranged according to committed investment, and to
explain inhowfar they can be relevant and advantageous for firms in transition
economies (see e.g. James and Weidenbaum 1993; Rumer, 1994).°
Licensing
Under a licensing agreement, a firm sells limited rights to produce and to sell its
products to another firm. In the past, it was often the only way for western firms
to enter markets in the Central and Eastern European countries. Its advantage
concerning the aims of CEEF is the possibility of finding access to foreign tech-
nologies. This advantage, however, might be partly offset by the fact that the li-
censer — here: the western firm — sometimes refrains from sharing essential
technological know-how because he fears opportunism on the side of the licen-
see. Moreover, the western firm is — as the licenser — in a dominant position as
This overview is by no meaas complete and does not comprise all possible forms of network
cooperation. It is only meant to list the ..milestones" among different network types according to the
extent of commitment between the partners. • •23
to the licensee. He can use the threat not to renew the licensing arrangement as a
market-like sanction because he is not strongly committed to the cooperation by
high investment. This can cause a potential for conflicts being implied in the li-
censing relations, which increases the costs of contracting and control. However,
licensing relations can — since they can be established without high invest-
ment — serve as a kind of test for more intensive forms of cooperation: If the li-
censee proves to be reliable, the licenser might want to extend the relations to-
wards more stable networking activities such as strategic alliances or joint ven-
tures, which involve stronger commitment of all partners.
Franchising
Franchising is a kind of a far-reaching licensing arrangement where the franchiser
licenses an entire business system including brand name, image and know-how to
the franchisee, who in turn puts his business completely at the franchiser's dis-
posal. The relations in this form of cooperation are more balanced, i.e. deter-
mined by interdependence than in a licensing agreement because the franchiser
risks his image and reputation if the cooperation fails. Franchising seems to be
most suitable for services and retail activities where it has become very success-
ful on an international level in recent years, possibly due to internationally con-
verging consumer preferences (e.g. McDonalds, Benetton). For CEEF in these
sectors, franchising agreements have for a long time been a way. of participating
in global networks and of acquiring international business know-how, The impact
on economic growth of this type of networking activity though, being neither very
much suited for high-tech industries nor for manufacturing in general, can be
doubted.24
Subcontracting arrangements
Subcontracting or outsourcing arrangements encompass all kinds of middle- or
long-term production relations, mostly as buyer-supplier (vertical) agreements.
They can start as simple outward processing activities, in which a western firm
sources out those parts of its manufacturing process for which it has no longer
any comparative advantage and which are not centrally positioned as to the qual-
ity of its final product. CEEF might in particular take over labour-intensive pro-
duction and supply of components in this context and will thus hold a somewhat
subordinate position in the network because crucial functions such as manage-
ment decisions, design and administration will remain under the control of the
western partner. If the relations prove successful, the partners might be inclined
to invest specifically and to increase their extent, stability and trust. Such long-
term interdependent subcontracting relations can be quite similar to the ideal
scheme of a network in the theory: information and know-how will flow freely
among the network members and through a process of technology transfer and
interactive learning, the CEEF can improve their position in the network. They
might over time become partly responsible for product development and quality
control, change from component suppliers towards system suppliers with their
own subcontractors or — if their specialization advantages are sufficiently high
due to
! specific investment •— even become single suppliers for certain systems,
assuring a strong position of power towards their buyer. Since this type of net-
working activity often extends to truly global value-chains, the different firm cul-
tures and language barriers together with the conflict potential arising from de-
pendency disequilibria can impose relatively high costs of managing the relations.25
Strategic alliances
A strategic alliance is commonly defined as a form of long-term cooperation in
which the allied firms coordinate certain business fields, intending to improve
their position against other competitors. Each partner brings in his characteristical
strengths and tries to compensate his weaknesses and to create synergies with his
partners. Typical of strategic alliances is that the cooperating firms are lead by a
focal or 'hub'-firm, which centrally coordinates the network relations. Strategic
alliances can take place on a vertical or on a horizontal level. Especially horizon-
tal alliances among international companies in high-tech industries (e.g. aviation
industry), which intend to undertake extremely costly projects which are too re-
source-intensive for a single firm to cope with, have become more and more im-
portant in recent years. Although interdependencies are high in this form of net-;
working activity, the conflict potential is considerable. This is partly due to. the
danger of opportunism arising from the exchange of high-tech know-how and
partly to cultural and language barriers among the international partners. For
CEEF, such alliances are not of a significant relevance yet because they often
lack essential resources which could make them an interesting partner for western
firms. However, this picture might change considerably in the future.
Joint ventures
 : • . •
A joint venture is an alliance where the alliance partners decide to found and run
a legally independent company, involving equity capital of all partners. On the
one hand, the equity involvement increases the stability of the relations: the part-
ners are threatened to lose their investment in case of a failure. On the other hand,
it increases the costs: only firms with a certain resource basis can undertake the
investment and the complex contracting process. The stability of the relations
contributes to a relatively unhindered flow of know-how and information, from26
which especially the Central and Eastern European partners can gain. If a joint
venture is established, the technology transfer involved might create considerable
spill-over effects, which are beneficial for the entire country and can upgrade
large parts of its production. In the long run, this can make CEEF very attractive
alliance partners for international companies and promote their presence on west-
ern markets.





















































Despite the high investment of the partners, joint ventures are often observed to
be quite unstable and difficult to manage (Grup d'Analisi de la Transicio
Economica, 1995). The high risk due to equity involvement as well as cultural
and language barriers complicate the management of the network relations —
although cultural and language barriers are not so important in projects between
These costs include capital resources and internal transaction costs. Internal transaction costs
comprise the costs of managing internal quarrels and mistrust which occur after internalizing
transactions into a network or a hierarchy. They are not really considered by the transaction cost
theory.27
Eastern European and some Western European countries (e.g. Germany), which
still dominate FDI in almost all Central and Eastern European countries.
1
2
So far, networking activities between Eastern and Western European firms have
only been to a minor extent technology-orientated. They have been largely domi-
nated by relations that only involve little commitment, such as licensing and sub-
contracting (Table 6), which is not very surprising if the comparative advantage
of the Central and Eastern European countries is considered.
Table 6 - Structure of cooperation relations between EEC-firms and CEEF at the




















However, this specialization pattern between east and west can only subsist in the
short run because in the long run, wages will rise as productivity and technologi-
cal standards increase. For CEEF, this implies that only a strong, long-term-orien-
tated commitment in their network relations — such as long-term contracts, spe-
cific investment of all partners or even equity involvement — offers them the
possibility to reach a higher level of specialization than simple outward process-
As an example, the share of German arid Austrian FDlin the FDI stock or' most Central European
countries is relatively high; it amounted to 53 percent in the Slovak Republic, 44 percent in Slovenia,
42 percent in Hungary and 35 percent in the Czech Republic by December 1995. Only in Poland this
share was relatively low with 14 percent. (Hunya, 1996).28
ing, to participate in an international exchange of crucial technologies and to ef-
ficiently manage their dependencies:
V. Concluding remarks
The restructuring process as well as the rapidly changing economic conditions
have imposed a major challenge for CEEF to survive in the struggle of interna-
tional competition. An efficient way to organize international production activities
and to link into global production chains thus might prove to be the crucial factor
for success or failure. Network forms of organization combine characteristics of
both markets and hierarchies, ideally accounting for flexibility and stability of the
organization and might represent a viable organizational alternative for CEEF un-
der the given economic conditions.
Due to the possibility of adapting the network relations to changes in these con-
ditions and due to the possibility of creating an atmosphere of trust among the
network members being most beneficial for information and technology transfers,
network forms of organization cannot be simply considered a ,,second best" al-
ternative as compared to FDI in the international production and innovation proc-
ess. Very often, they might prove to be superior for CEEF, especially if the lower
investment of resources needed and the lower risk involved in the building of the
relations are taken into account.
In spite of this, network strategies (with or without equity involvement) are still
looked at with considerable scepticism by many CEEF. They are often seen as
strategies of western multinationals to expand their sphere of influence on the
cost of their Eastern European partners. These sceptics, however, overlook the
dynamic character of network relations: They occur in a world of growing global
dependencies among firms and persist, even strengthen because the partners in-29
volved in the network have an interest in maintaining the relations through which
they intend to realize some comparative advantage over their competitors. Con-
sequently, firms contribute parts of their resources to the network and invest spe-
cifically, which increases interdependence among the network members and
stabilizes the relations. Thus, a network of firms is not a strategy of creating de-
pendence of an Eastern European firm on its western counterpart, but of internal-
izing dependencies which already exist in a world of globalization into a stable
organizational form.
It is true that in most cases the positions might not be balanced between the part-
ners. This kind of conflict potential is not a specific characteristic of east-west
networking, but is to be found in most cooperative relations, especially on a
buyer-supplier level. However, this does not hinder firms in a somewhat subordi-
nate position to derive an economic advantage from the network relations as long
as resources and information circulate among the network members.
Referring to the CEEF, this could mean that through networking activities, they
have the chance of upgrading their production and of increasing productivity and
hence, wages. As simple outward processing activities become obsolete with ris-
ing wages, the network might develop into a more technology-orientated coop-
eration in the end. However, if the CEEF want to ,,move up the ladder" in the
global production system in this way, they have to enter the system first. As this
paper tried to show, joining in networking activities with western partners ap-
pears to be a promising strategy in this context.30
References
Axelsson, Bjorn (1990), International Networks: Some Strategic Issues, Paper
presented at the workshop ,,On the Socio-economics of Inter-firm
Cooperation", 11-13/07/1990, WZB, Berlin.
BeyfuG, Jorg (1996), Erfahrungen deutscher Auslandsinvestoren in Reformldn-
derh Mittel- und Osteuropas, Beitrage zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik
Nr. 232, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Koln.
Blaine, Michael J. (1994), Co-operation in International Business, Aldershot
„ .,. etal.
Bonus, Holger (1986), The cooperative association as a business enterprise: A
study in the economics of transactions, in: Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics, Vol. 142: 310-339.
Coase, R. H. (1937), The nature of the firm, in: Economica, Vol. 4: 386-405.
Dunning, John H. (1995), The role of foreign direct investment in a globalizing
economy, in: Banca Nazionale de Lavoro Quarterly Review, Vol.
XLVffi, No. 193: 155-244.
Gleich, Arnim v., Rainer Lucas (1994), Veranderte Standortanforderungen in
einer zukiinftigen Unternehmenslandschaft, in: Informationsdienst des
Instituts fur Okologische Wirtschqftsforschung und der Vereinigung fur
Okologische Wirtschaftsforschung e.V., Vol. 4. No. 2: 1-4.
Grup d'Analisi de la Transicio Economica (1995) (ed.), Joint Ventures in Trans-
formation Countries in the Context of Overall Investment Strategies of
their Partners, A.C.E. Research Project No. 92-0123-R, Barcelona.
Hakansson, Hakan (ed.) (1987), Industrial Technological Development: A Net-
work Approach, London et al.
Hakansson, Hakan (1989), Corporate Technological Behaviour — Co-operation
and Networks, London, New York.31
Hunya, Gabor (1996), Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Modernization
in CEECs, unpublished paper, The Vienna Institute for Comparative
Economic Studies, Vienna.
James, Harvey S., Murray Weidenbaum (1993), When Businesses Cross Interna-
tional Borders, The Washington Papers No. 161, Westport/Connecticut.
Jarillo, J. Carlos (1988), On strategic, networks, in: Strategic Management
Journal, Vol. 9: 31-41 - - ; ,• . :- .•<:-.. ,
Johanson, Jan, Lars-Gunnar Mattson (1991), Interorganizational. relations in
industrial systems: a network approach compared with,the.transactions-
cost approach, in: Grahame Thompson et al. (eds.), Markets, Hierar-
chies and Networks, London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: 256-264.
Kroger, Fritz et al. (1994), Duale Restrukturierung, Stuttgart.
Pfeffer, Jeffrey (1987), A resource dependence perspective on intercorporate
relations, in: Mark S. Mizruchi, Michael Schwartz (eds.), Intercorporate
Relations — the Structural Analysis of Business, Cambridge: 25-55.
Pfeffer, Jeffrey, Gerald R. Salancik (1978), The External Control of Organiza-
tions: A Resource Dependence Perspective, New York.
Picot, Arnold (1982), Transaktionskostenansatz in der Organisationstheorie:
Stand der Diskussion und Aussagewert, in: DBW, Vol. 42: 267-284
Picot, Arnold, H. Dietl. (1990), Transaktionskostentheorie, in: WiSt, Vol. 19:
178-184.
Piore, Michael J., Charles F. Sabel (1984), The Second Industrial Divide: Possi-
bilities for Prosperity, New York.
Powell, Walter W. (1991), Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of
organization, in: Grahame Thompson et al. (eds.), Markets, Hierarchies
and Networks, London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: 265-276.32
Rumer, Klaus (1994), Internationale Kooperationen und Joint Ventures, Wies-
baden.
Siebert, Holger (1991), Okonomische Analyse von Unternehmensnetzwerken, in:
Wolfgang H. Staehle, Jorg Sydow (eds.), Managementforschung 1,
Berlin, New York: 291-311.
Storper, Michael (1995), Territories, flows and hierarchies in the global economy,
in: Aufienwirtschaft, Vol. 50, No. II: 265-293.
Sydow, Jorg (1992a), Strategische Netzwerke — Evolution und Organisation,
Wiesbaden.
Sydow, Jorg (1992b), Strategische Netzwerke und Transaktionskosten, in:
Wolfgang H. Staehle, Peter Conrad (eds.), Managementforschung 2,
Berlin, New York: 239-312.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-trust
• Implications, New York.
Williamson, Ob'ver E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms,
Markets, Relational Contracting, New York.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1991), Vergleichende okonomische Organisationstheorie:
Die Analyse diskreter Strukturalternativen, in: D. Ordelheide, B.
Rudolph, E. Biisselmann (eds.), Betriebswirtschaftslehre und okonomi-
sche Theorie, Stuttgart: 13-49.
Zschiedrich, Harald (1994), Vom Absatzmarkt zum Kooperationspartner —
Uberlegungen zur weiteren Vertiefung der internationalen Kooperation
mit den Wirtschaften in den Reformstaaten Mittel- und Osteuropas
(RMO), in: Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, Vol. 39: 251-268.